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Abstract
Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individu-
als) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given
the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either coopera-
tion or conflict, the phenomenon of local aggregation is modeled. In
particular the number of coalitions is determined according to a mini-
mum conflict principle. It is found not to be always two. Along these
lines, previous studies are revisited and are found not to be consistent
with their own principles. The model is then used to describe the frag-
mentation of former Yugoslavia. Results are compared to the actual
situation.
PACS: 87.23.Ge (Dynamics of social systems) and 75.50.Lk (Spin
glasses and other random magnets)
1 Introduction
Physical concepts might prove useful in describing collective social phenom-
ena. Indeed models inspired by statistical physics are now appearing in
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scientific literature [1].
The process of aggregation among a set of actors seems to be a good
candidate for a statistical physics like model. These actors might be coun-
tries which ally into international coalitions, companies which adopt com-
mon standards, parties that make alliances, individuals which form different
interest groups, and so on.
Given a set of actors, there always exists an associated distribution of
bilateral propensities towards either cooperation or conflict. The question
then arises as to how to satisfy such opposing constraints simultaneously. In
other words, what kind of alliances, if any, will optimize all actor bilateral
trends to respectively conflict or cooperation.
It turns out that a similar problem does exist in spin glasses. For these
systems, magnetic exchanges are distributed randomly between ferro and
antiferromagnetic couplings. Indeed such an analogy has been used in the
past in a few models.
The first one is by Axelrod and Bennett (hereafter denoted as AB) [2].
They apply the physical concept of minimum energy to single out the stable
coalitions within an configuration landscape. Later Galam demonstrated
that the AB model is not fully consistent with its physical content. He then
suggested a second model (hereafter denoted as G) based on both random
bond and random site exchanges [3].
We propose here a qualitative extension of defining the coalition problem.
While all previous approaches used implicitly a 2-side coalition dynamics, we
allow multi-side coalitions. We indeed define the actual number of alliances
as an internal parameter of the problem to be determined by simultane-
ously optimizing all bilateral propensities. While an Ising like variable may
be appropriate to a huge number of problems both in physics and outside
physics, there is no a priori reason to consider coalition dynamics restricted
to a bimodal distribution.
We then apply our model to study the fragmentation of former Yu-
goslavia. Results are compared to the actual situation. We also revisit
previous studies along this new scheme of not setting a priori the number
of coalitions. As soon as the artificial bimodal constraint is relaxed, their
results are no more consistent with reality.
Moreover, in physics models the exchange couplings and their distri-
butions are known. In contrast, in the coalition problem the quantitative
determination of bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict is a
major challenge. We discuss this matter and argue that previous propensity
calculations were too simplistic.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second part we
review the AB and G models. The qualitative extension to multimodal
coalitions is discussed in Section 3. On this basis, we revisit in Section 4
the cases of the Second World War and the Unix standard setting (studied
in Ref. [2] and respectively [4]). The case of the fragmentation of former
Yugoslavia is analyzed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are contained in
last Section.
2 Former models
2.1 The Axelrod-Bennett model (AB)
Axelrod and Bennett first attempted [2] to explain the composition of coali-
tions using some characteristics of the involved actors (the elements of the
system). The relative affinity between actor i and actor j is measured by
a pairwise propensity pij , which is negative when they are in conflict and
positive when they like to cooperate (with pii = 0). Differences in actor
sizes are expressed by assigning to each one a weight factor si (a positive
quantity). It may be a demographic, economic or military factor, or an
aggregate parameter.
The creation of coalitions among the actors introduces a distance dij
between each pair (i, j) of actors. It is 0 if i and j belong to the same
coalition and 1 when they are in different coalitions. A given partition X of
the actors into coalitions is equivalent to knowing all dij .
A “frustration” of each actor i is introduced to measure how much a
configuration X satisfies its propensities. It writes,
Fi =
n∑
j=1
sjpijdij(X) , (1)
where we considered a group of n actors.
Adding all actor frustrations, respectively weighted by their sizes, results
in an “energy” of the system,
E(X) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
siFi , (2)
which is,
E(X) =
n∑
i>j
sisjpijdij(X) . (3)
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It is then postulated that the actual configuration of the system is the
one which minimizes the energy. The path followed by the system into the
coalition landscape space from an initial configuration follows the direction
of the greatest gradient of energy. Once a minimum is reached the system
does not change.
The AB model has been applied to the study of the alliances of the Sec-
ond World War [2]. It was also used to study the standard setting coalitions
formed by the companies which developed the Unix operating system [4].
Later Galam has demonstrated several inconsistencies of the AB model
[5]. Here we found additional setbacks (see Section 4).
2.2 Galam reformulation of the AB model
Galam has shown [3] that in case of bimodal coalitions (A and B), the AB
model is totally equivalent to a finite spin glass at zero temperature.
Accordingly, configurations can be expressed by the spin variables ηi,
where the spin is +1 if the actor i belongs to coalition A and it is -1 if the
actor belongs to B. The distances can be rewritten as dij =
1
2
(1 − ηiηj).
The energy becomes,
E(X) = E0 −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijηi(X)ηj(X) , (4)
where Jij = sisjpij and
E0 =
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jij (5)
is a constant which depends only on the given sizes and propensities, but
not on the configurations.
2.3 The Galam model (G)
Galam [3] introduced a new model for the case of bimodal coalitions where
the two alliances have clear characteristics that would allow to define for
each actor a natural belonging ǫi to each alliance. It is +1 if the actor i
should be in coalition A, according to its own characteristics compared with
those of A. It is -1 for B and 0 if there is no natural belonging to neither A
or B.
In the G model, the benefit Jij of cooperation or conflict between a
pair of countries in either the same or opposite alliance is accounted for in
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addition to the local bond propensities Gij . Both add together to a total
propensity pij = Gij + ηiηjJij .
In parallel, forces (like military or economic mechanisms) by which each
coalition as a whole couples to the orientation of a given actor are expressed
in terms of an external field βi. It contributes to the overall conflict through
the product βibiηi, where βi = ±1 represents the direction of the force that
acts on actor i (towards A or B), while bi > 0 is the amplitude of this force.
The total energy of the system sums up to
E = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
(Gij + ǫiǫjJij)ηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi . (6)
This model has been used [3] to explain the stability of alliances during
the cold war, with opposing NATO and Warsaw pacts. The fragmentation
of Eastern Europe which resulted from the Warsaw pact dissolution as well
as the simultaneous western stability was recovered within the model. The
European construction versus stability and the Chinese stability were also
analyzed within the same model [3].
3 Beyond previous models
3.1 A new approach: going multimodal
In physics, the symmetry of the internal degrees of freedom of a given system
is clearly determined from specific measurements on the studied material. In
particular, most magnetic systems may be modeled using a spin variable. It
can be, among others, a 2-state Ising variable, a q-state Potts model, a XY
spin with planar symmetry, or a Heisenberg spin with continuous symmetry.
In the case of human systems, the a priori restriction of using an Ising
variable has no ground. Some known coalitions exhibit more than 2 simul-
taneous alliances, though not much more. For example, the users and the
producers of personal computers can be divided in at least three categories,
with regard to the operating system they use (Windows, Mac OS, Linux
\ Unix); there were three groups that fought each other between 1941 and
1945 in the space of ex-Yugoslavia: the Chetnik guerilla groups, the Com-
munist bands and the Nazis [6]; and in most democratic countries there are
more than two independent political parties.
We extend previous approaches by allowing for multimodal coalitions.
We assume the number q of coalitions to be an internal degree of freedom to
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vary from 1 up to n. Before, q was arbitrarily fixed to 2. The spin variable ηi
can thus take q different values. Distances are expressed as dij = 1−δ(ηi, ηj)
and the energy is
E(X) = 2E0 −
n∑
i>j
Jijδ(ηi(X), ηj(X)) , (7)
where E0 is given by equation (5). This corresponds to the q state Potts
model [7]. The initial expression of the energy, equation (3), can still be
used.
To demonstrate that the increase in the number of allowed coalitions may
reduce the energy of the system, we will discuss the example of a system
with n = 3 actors. We assume J12 = J23 = J13 = −1.
If we impose only one coalition, the energy is 0. If we impose two coali-
tions, the minimum energy is -2 and is three times degenerated (the system
is frustrated). If we don’t impose a fixed number of coalitions, the system
sets itself in a configuration with three different coalitions (all the actors are
independent), with an energy -3, the lowest energy possible.
3.2 Gauge transformations
Let us consider a transformation of the distances as d′ij = a dij + b. The
energy becomes
E′(X) =
n∑
i>j
Jijd
′
ij(X) = aE(X) + 2bE0 . (8)
If a > 0 this transformation keeps unchanged the dynamics of the system.
An interesting transformation is given by d′ij = 2dij−1. That is d
′
ij = −1
if i and j are in the same coalition and d′ij = 1 if not. For bimodal coalitions,
we have d′ij = −ηiηj . The energy expressed with this distance accounts
equally for conflict and cooperation.
Another interesting transformation is d′′ij = dij − 1, which gives d
′′
ij =
−δ(ηi, ηj). In this case the energy is exactly the Potts energy,
E′′(X) =
n∑
i>j
Jijd
′′
ij(X) = −
n∑
i>j
Jijδ(ηi(X), ηj(X)) . (9)
The minimization of this energy maximizes the cooperation.
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Because all these distances yield the same dynamics of the system, it
doesn’t need to be specified exactly if the actor aim is, psychologically, the
minimization of conflicts, the maximization of cooperation, or both, and in
which proportion. However, this prevents us from comparing the energies of
different systems (including the same actors with some propensities changed)
until this is established. In our study we will stick to the original AB form
of the distance (which minimizes conflicts).
3.3 Neutrality
The introduction of spin variables allows us to consider the possibility of
neutrality by letting the spins to have also the value ηi = 0. In the case of
bimodal coalitions, this is straightforward. In the case of n coalitions, the
energy (7) has to be rewritten as
E = 2E0 −
n∑
i>j
Jijδ(ηi, ηj)[1− δ(ηiηj , 0)] , (10)
where the last factor accounts for the case when both i and j are neutral.
4 Application to real cases
4.1 The case of the Second World War
Axelrod and Bennett have applied their model of aggregation to explain
the composition of the opposing alliances during the Second World War [2].
The actors are 17 European countries involved in the war. Country sizes are
measured with a national capabilities index which combines six components
of demographic, industrial and military power. Propensities are computed
from 1936 data. The criteria used are: ethnic conflicts, religion, border
disagreements, type of government and history of war. They are combined
with equal weights.
After numerical minimization of the energy, two different minima were
found. The absolute one corresponds to respectively Britain, France, So-
viet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Denmark in one coali-
tion versus Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Portugal, Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the other one. After the criteria of Axelrod
and Bennett (who measure the alignment by whether a country was invaded
by another country, or had war declared against it), this corresponds to the
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historical reality, with the exception of Poland, which is on the wrong side,
and of Portugal, which was neutral. There exists another local minimum
with Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Greece versus all the others.
While Axelrod and Bennett exhibit this result as a validation of their
model, they hardly comment a crucial assumption they made. They sup-
posed that the 17 countries can be partitioned in only 2 coalitions. Even
if this was the historical reality, this artificially added constraint does not
fit to the principles of the model. The final configuration should be deter-
mined only by the actors’ pairwise interactions, via the minimization of the
energy. Nothing restricts a priori the existence of more than 2 coalitions.
A partition in two coalitions should be indeed a result of the model and a
proof of its predictiveness.
4.2 Revisiting the Second World War case
We have redone the AB computation using the same data set for sizes and
propensities (which is available on Internet [8]).
We first confirmed the AB results once the number of coalitions is re-
stricted to 2. We then introduced the possibility of spin 0 in the hope
of capturing the neutrality of Portugal while keeping the other conditions
unchanged. The results stay unchanged with no country neutral.
We then allowed an a priori unlimited number of coalitions (from 1 up
to n = 17). Exploring then the full energy landscape, we found that there
exists one single minimum associated to 3 alliances. They are respectively
Soviet Union and Greece versus Germany, Italy, Estonia and Latvia versus
Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania,
Hungary, Portugal, Finland and Lithuania. This minimum has an energy
E = −132.36. It is much less than the energies of the two AB configurations
which are respectively -94.23 and -91.06.
We also tried to find a 2 coalition configuration imposing geographical
constraints, but the result stays a three alliance configuration. This shows
that, in fact, the real prediction of the AB model, using the same propensi-
ties, is rather far from the historical reality.
4.3 The Unix case
Axelrod et al. applied the AB model of aggregation to explain also the
formation of standard setting alliances, like for the Unix operating system
[4]. The actors are 9 companies involved in the development of Unix (AT&T,
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Sun, Apollo, DEC, HP, Intergraph, SGI, IBM and Prime). Sizes are given by
the firms’ share in the technical workstation market or by expert estimates
(for AT&T).
If a firm i belongs to alliance L, its utility (the satisfaction of the eco-
nomic agent, given by its profit) is expressed by
Ui(L) =
∑
j∈L
sj −

α
∑
j∈L′
sj + (α+ β)
∑
j∈L′′
sj

 , (11)
where sj is the size of firm j, and L
′ and L′′ form a partition of alliance
L into distant and close rivals of i (L = L′ ∪ L′′ and L′ ∩ L′′ = ∅). The
parameters α and β are positive. The identification of close and distant
rivals is done from the degree of specialization of the firms in the production
of Unix-based workstations.
We may rewrite the utility as
Ui(L) =
∑
j∈L
sjpij =
n∑
j=1
(1− dij)sjpij , (12)
where the last expression gives the utility of i without having to specify its
alliance. This leads to the propensities pij = 1 − α, if i and j are distant
rivals, and pij = 1− (α+ β), if i and j are close rivals.
The energy (3) equals
E = 2E0 −
1
2
n∑
i=1
siUi , (13)
so a minimization of the energy yields a weighted maximization of the util-
ities.
For the choice of parameters α = β = 1 (and in all cases for which
0.8 ≤ α ≤ 1.5, 0.7 ≤ β ≤ 1.5), Axelrod et al. found 2 minimums of the
energy with the same value. One configuration is Sun, DEC and HP versus
AT&T, Apollo, Intergraph, SGI, Prime and IBM. The other one is Sun,
AT&T, Prime and IBM versus DEC, HP, Apollo, Intergraph and SGI. The
latter configuration corresponds to Unix International vs. Open Software
Foundation, and only IBM is incorrectly assigned.
Axelrod et al. advocate this result in favor of the effectiveness of their
methodology. However, they have again imposed the artificial constraint of
allowing only a maximum of 2 coalitions. They motivate this choice by the
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fact that “the positive externality created by standardization declines as the
number of standards increases and thereby reduces the principal advantage
of setting standards, which is a larger post-standardization market” ([4], p.
1498).
But this condition is in fact included in the formula of the utility Ui(L),
which grows linearly with the total size of coalition L. Therefore, the aggre-
gation of firms into a small number of alliances should be only the result of
the energy minimization. If the utility grows faster than linearly with the
coalition size (which may be the case in reality), and the linear approxima-
tion is not good enough, then even if we impose a maximum of 2 coalitions
the result would be wrong, because of the discrepancy between the real and
the modeled utility.
4.4 Revisiting the Unix case
We checked the above model with no conditions imposed on the coalition
number. For the case α = β = 1 there exist 150 different minimums of the
energy, with an average of 6.57 coalitions per configuration. This is definitely
a bad choice of parameters because all the propensities are negative or 0, so
there is little incentive for aggregation.
The condition for the beginning of aggregation is α < 1. We sampled
the interval 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.9, 0 ≤ β ≤ 2, with a step of 0.1. For α + β < 1, all
firms form a single block (all propensities are positive). Configurations with
2 coalitions appear in an interval given roughly by 1− α < β < 2(1− α).
There are 14 types of configurations of 2 coalitions. We ranked their
importance from the number of pairs (α, β) for which they are realized,
weighted with the size of their basin of attraction. The most preferred
configurations are (i) Sun, AT&T and IBM versus the others (29.6 %), (ii)
AT&T and Apollo versus the others (28.4 %), (iii) IBM, DEC and Apollo
versus the others (12.5%), the rest having less than 10 % each.
The “best” configuration predicted by Axelrod et al. is not realized at
all, while the other configuration they predicted has rank 4 (5.5%). The
real empirical configuration Sun, AT&T and Prime versus the others has
rank 9 (2.7%) and doesn’t have a basin of attraction greater than 6% for
any combination of parameters.
Again, as for the Second World War, the prediction of the non con-
strained AB model, using the same propensities, doesn’t fit the empirical
reality.
10
5 A new application: the case of Yugoslavia
We have studied a new problem, the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia.
The actors are its 8 administrative entities (provinces or republics): Serbia,
Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro.
Here a coalition means a federation of entities, or an independent state if it
has only one member.
In the initial configuration all the actors are in the same coalition - the
former Yugoslavian federation. The system is then left to evolve in the
direction of the greatest gradient of energy down to the minimum which
should correspond to the stable configuration.
To implement our model we needed first to evaluate all the propensities
among the set of the 8 entities. The ethnic group diversity [6] of the whole set
is a major ingredient which we considered in evaluating those propensities.
We also took into account differences in religion and language. Entity sizes
are taken proportional to population sizes.
We used the 1981 census results [9], [6]. We considered eight major eth-
nic groups: Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins,
Albanians and Hungarians. We neglected in our study the influence of other
ethnic groups. They accounted for less than 1% each of the total population
of Yugoslavia in 1981. We also neglected the 5.4% of the population which
label themselves Yugoslavian. We assumed this later group to be perfectly
tolerant of the others (zero propensity).
Due to lack of accurate data for all the entities, we considered all the
Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins to be Orthodox Christians; all the
Croats, Slovenes and Hungarian to be Catholic Christians; and all the Mus-
lims and Albanians to be Muslim. For 1999, there exist differences up to
25% between the figures for nationality and religion, but in most cases they
are much less [10]. We classified the ethnic groups, with regard to their lan-
guage, as Serbo-Croats (Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Montenegrins), other
Slavs (Macedonians and Slovenes) and non Slavs (Albanians and Hungari-
ans) [6].
The propensities between pairs of entities are computed as follows:
pij =
8∑
k,l
qikqjlwkl , (14)
where qik represents the percentage of ethnic group k in entity i and wkl
represents the pairwise propensity between ethnic groups k and l.
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For k = l, wkk = +1. For k 6= l, the wkl’s are computed as the sum
of 2 terms. One stands for religion and the other for language: wkl =
ωreligion(k, l) + ωlanguage(k, l).
We used the hypothesis that Christians are more tolerant of other Chris-
tian religion members than for Muslims. We also assumed that the Serbo-
Croats are more tolerant of other Slavs than of non Slavs.
For religion, the factor ωreligion is positive and equals +ω1 for pairs of
ethnic group with the same religion. It is negative and equals −ω2 for pairs
of Catholic Christian and Orthodox Christian ethnic groups. For pairs of
Christian and Muslim groups, the factor is −ω3.
For language, the factor ωlanguage is +ω4 in the case of two Serbo-
Croatian speaking groups. For pairs of two different Slav groups, the factor
is −ω5. For pairs that include at least a non Slavic language, the factor is
−ω6. All the ωi’s are positive.
The graduation of tolerance previously described yields the following
conditions: ω2 < ω3 and ω5 < ω6. We also have the condition ω1 + ω4 < 1
to prevent a pairwise propensity between 2 different ethnic groups to be
greater than the propensity within the same group, which is the reference
factor for other propensities.
The parameters ωi are unknown. We varied those parameters in the
domain 0 < ω1,4 < 0.5; 0 < ω3,6 < 1; ω2 < ω3; ω5 < ω6, with a step of 0.05
and checked the results predicted by the minimization of the energy. There
are 28 resulting configurations (from a total of 4140 possibilities).
All these configurations respect the geographical connectivity. We ranked
them from the number of cases they are realized, weighted with the relative
size of their basin of attraction in each case. Only three configurations ap-
pear in more than 10% of cases each and 11 other appear in more than 1%
of cases each.
The main three configurations are: (i) A federation including Serbia,
Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Vojvodina, with the other entities being
independent, is obtained in 42.4% of cases. (ii) In 12.1% of cases the result
is Serbia, Montenegro and Vojvodina, and the others independent. (iii) In
10.9% of cases, only Serbia and Vojvodina stay together.
The above results yield the real configuration which resulted from the
fragmentation of Yugoslavia for the second largest set of parameters. We
considered Kosovo practically separated from Serbia because of its special
situation after the 1999 war, under the control of NATO peacekeepers.
For this final configuration, in 31% of cases (for example for a choice of
parameters ωi like (0.2, 0.5, 0.6, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5)), the order of fragmentation
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is the real one: Croatia and Slovenia - June 1991, Macedonia - September
1991, Bosnia - April 1992, with the general exception of Kosovo. Our model
predicts its splitting from Yugoslavia on the first or the third step, due to its
mostly Albanian population. Within our model and the G model we might
say that Kosovo was artificially kept inside Serbia using an external field.
The field was then destroyed by the NATO bombing.
6 Conclusion
The introduction of analogies inspired from spin glass models into the study
of social systems makes possible the prediction of the dynamics of macro-
scopic alliances formation within a given system of actors. While pairwise
interactions are clearly instrumental in this approach, there is no scientific
method to date to select the factors to be accounted for in their evaluation.
We have shown in particular that previous studies were not consistent
with their own principles. Using the propensities and sizes computed from
their methodology and then computing the resulting configurations, follow-
ing strictly and solely the principle of the minimum energy, we have shown
that the results don’t fit any more to reality. Nevertheless we have also
shown that there exist some parameter ranges which do yield the real situ-
ation.
We have also emphasized that analogies with physics should not mean
a straight mapping. A major difference here is to consider the number of
alliances to be a free internal parameter of the system. In physics it is
predetermined.
In conclusion our approach validates the feasibility of modeling strategic
international behavior, but at the same time it demonstrates also the dangers
of taking it too simplistically. Within our model, we have also reported
configurations which don’t fit to reality. At this stage, this shows that
more work is necessary to single out a feasible scheme for the evaluation of
parameters.
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